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BACKGRCIJND NOryE
rc- JAPAN RET.,ATICI{S
the Ewopean Conrnrnity and Japan together produce about 40 per
cent of the r^,orld's g:oss product and account for roughly 40
1nr cent of all international trade. Each has the United States
as a nrajor ecrcncruic partner. Yet direct lirks between the EC
and Japan, particularly jrr trade and other econcrnic terms are
disproportionately $,eak.
It is a priority of ttre H:ropean Cornn:nity's e:cternal relations
poliqf to strengthen the Etr-r.Tapan side of the E-USrJapan trian-
g1e.
With 320 million custcners, the Etr is the free world's largest market.
Japanrs populatlon is little nrrre than one third that of the tr.
the population of the United States is just over Lr,ro thirds that
of the tr. Yet Japan's trade with the United States is tlrree
tjnres that of its trade with the E. Of course, there are rea-
sons of postr,,rar history for this disparity. But these are no
longer as valid as they rnalr have been; and it is tinre for tJ:e
trianqle to becrxne better balanced. In ttre Ccrnrunityrs vievr,
the strengthenilg of the ECdapa.n fink must be acccnq:anied by a
reaI, tanqible jmpact on the striJcing inrbalance in trade dtich
has persisted and, jl terms of a rising yen, has jncreased over
the years.
The Cornnunity's structural trade deficit with Japan has contirrued
to rise irr trU* terms, crowing frcrn 14 billion mU jx 1983 to 16.5billion ECU in 1984 and an estirnated 18 bil-lion ECU in 1985. There
*1 rcU = 1.39 CAD
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has also been a qualitative deterioration, ttrat is to say, a
decline il the value-added level of Csnrn:nity exports. Ttre gap
could widen sti1l fr.:rther as a result of a slo,,idcn/m in US dennnd
or the more rnarked rise il the yen against the doIlar ccnpared toits appreci-ation against E:ropean surrerrcies.
But the Connunity's problen with Japan is not sinply a natter of
tJre persistent trade imbalance. A si-rnilar imbalance rnarks Japan's
relations with npst of its industrialized or industrializing tra-
ding partners. This is synptonatic of the deeper-rooted problem
of the Japanese econorry not being sufficiently integrated with
the broader international econcxn)z.
In recent years Japan has anassed ever-larger'current account
zurp1uses, part of a heavily lopsided pattern at the broader inter-
national Ievel. This continuing trend is givJrrg rise to serious
problems jn npnetary and trade equili-brir:rn at r.orld level. I.'lhile
Japan's external surplus j-s to sore o<tent offset by the tlnited
States exbernal deficit, it also reflects Japan's lcnu 1eve1 of
rnanufactured irrports and structural bias tcxru:ards rnanufactrrred ex-ports. ltris stmcture is characterized by strong ties wittrjn each
of the large industrial groups cperathg jn the major sectors of
the ecrcncnrlr and by a high degree of verEj-cal integration; this
has a strong Srrpact orr e>rternal trade arxi tlre dqrestic distrj-bution
system. Ihe strategy pursued by Japan in its econcrn-ic and ccnner-
cj-aI relations wittr ttre rest of ttre r^rorld - and f::cm whrictr it tras
had the greatest benefit 
- is largely based on this stn:ctr-rre and
ncnv t}reatens to upset t-he *ro1e international system of trade and
finance, to the detri:rent not only of Japanrs partners but al.so
of Japan itself.
Japan already plays a significant part in internationat discussions
of trade, currenqf, financial and develo6rnent issues. ft raould novr
be appropriate for Japan to take on grreater responsibilities irr
these fields.
Diversified relations with Japan on an eqr:aI fmting might herp toidentify ways to crcr::ect the balance on the ecrcncrnic ard. tradefront in a wj-der context. Conversely, nrcre baranced econcrnic and
trade re-l-ations vould rem)ve causes of friction and nnke it easierto establish corprehensive and diversified ties. Ihe very j:rter-
relatedness of conpetitive strengttr, o<chanqe rates, developxnent,
the openino up of rnarkets tn ttre free nrcrzernent of goods and ser-
vices and the grrcnvino international role of bottr the yen and the
trU all nean fl:at tJre tr stands a better chance of developing a
harnonious, balanced relationship along ttrese 1ines.
In Japan itself a sirnilar recogrrition prevails at the highest Ieve1
witness several speeches by Prinre Minister y.asuhiro \lakasone durino
(
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the past 18 npnths. There is the same interest in inproving
the balance both of internatlonal econorn-Lc relations and of the
multilateral trade and payrents system.
MCNOIVIIC BACKGRCT-IND
Errer sj-nce Japa.n emerged as a power in jnternational trade, its
growth has been largely erport-Ied, Ieadi.ng to thre build-up over
the years of surpluses on ttre external account. the surpluses
are o(pected to go on increasing for the ne><t tr,,o years. Tl:e
latest Offi forecasts poixt to an jncrease j:r the overall current
account surplus frcm tlre $33 billion reached jn 1984 and $49.3billion (actual) in 1985 to $58 billion fn 1986 and over $62billion irr 1987, paralleled by the grro,rrth of the trade surplus.
Follcxrving the decisions taken by the Group of 5 on 23 Septenber,
1985, the Bank of Japan jntenzened decisively, along with other
central barks, to prsh the yen up against tlre dollar. In the long
term a stronger yen should help brilg dovm tlre trade and current
account surpJ-u.ses. T-n the last arralysis, hcxnever, tJte inpa.ct on e:<-
ternal balal-rces of an appreciati-ng currenry depends on tl:e eco-
ncnric trnlicies vdrich acccnpanlr it. It should also be borne in
mind that the yen has gained rnainly against the do11ar and thatits appreciation against Erropean currencies tras beerr npdest.
Japan's clrrrent account surplus is partly due to a structrral
irnba.lance betrreen dqnestic savings and investnent. ltte huge
savilgs strrplus reflects rryeak dcnestic dsnand, caused in turn
by tlre sluggish grcnrth of housetrold consurption, housi-:rg invest-
nent and pr:Jc1ic spendlng on social infrastnrctlre, and by Japan's
tax structure. l,learrvrtrile, Jatrxn has already changed frcrn a tradi-
tiornl inporter to an excorter of iadr:strial technology, and the
nrmber of nevr national patents is on tlte increase.
Irrhite the rnarked rise in exports of manufactures has been constant(totaI z 12.6? of world oports in 1982), its urports of nrarru-
factures have not developed in the sare way, but have for a
nurrber of years been stuck at aror.md 2.4% of vierrld irrports of nranu-
factures, as agalnsL L2Z for the Ccntrnrnity.
Thj-s imbalance is also illustrated by the follovuing :
Percentage of lnports of rnanufactures (GATT defjrrition) i1r rela-
tion to 1984 gross dcnestic product :
Ilnited States t 6.2%
Japan : 2.92
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Percentage of inports of nnnufactures in relation to total im-
ports in 1984 :
ff : 46.1%
United States : 66.42
Japa.n z 24.22
Per capita value of inports of rnanufactures in 1984 :
E : US$ 504
United States : US$ 949
Japan : US$ 271
(Concerning the E, the figures refer only to the trade with the
outside wcrld and don't take into account c.cnnercial orchanges
bebveen tr nernber countries. If those were included, ttre per
capita rzalue of furports of manufactures uould be nore thr,an
do$Ie. )
In an attenpt to raise the 1eveI of its inq:orts, Jalxn intro-
duced a series of rnarket opening packages, culm:inating in the
3-year Astion Prograrnre announced in July 1985.
the Japanese authorities claim not to be able to gauge its
inpact on the actual increase in tJ:e voh:ne of inports. Ihey
also claim tlnt the effects cn trade can only be snall in the
ccming nontJ:s. Despite the intention of ttre Japanese auttnrities
to speed up inplenentation of the Action Prograrre, tirc judgeent
of tlre Etr Ccnrncil of lfinisters last October ttr,at practical effects
were likely to be liJrdted and, in any case, slorr to make thern-
selves fe1t, rsnains valid.
Itre nreasures announced by tn<yo in Octcber and late Decenber to
stjnu:late dcnestic denrand will have only a rnarginal effect on the
o<ternal jmbalances. the official governnrent forecast is that the
October rreasures will boost total inports (no dor:bt lncluding
raw rnaterjals and serni-rnanufactures as well as rnanufactured qoods)
by $Z billion in 1986. Japanese private-sector institutes, hourever,put the figure at less ttran $1 billion. No figures have been ad-
vanced for tJre Decenber [easures. Prospects for a real inport
stimulus look poor in ttre short term.
POLITTCAL AT{D STRI]C:NMAL FACTORS
However, there is also il Japan - particularly in the jndustrial
and business comunity 
- a body of opinion eittrer opposed to
change, or sirply tendiag to jnertia or ccnq:lacenq/. T?re roots
of the problem wittr-i:r the systern itself are not 1ret widely reco-qnized, sti1l less openly a&nitted bv governnrent and a&ninistration.
Itrere are sti11 those in Tbkyo viho believe it will be enough for
Japan to cut dcr*m visjJcle ba:riers to trade and exlrort businessnen
to buy rnore foreign goods. Ihey see no need for darestic pollcry
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and stmctural ctnnges.
It is said to be up to the overseas orporter to rnake the effort to
increase sales to raftat, in their vi-ew, is ttre "free" Japanese
narket. Japan prides itself on having ttre "rrcst open narket
in tJ:e vlorld" - never mind the actual voh:nre of inports. O'thers
see a reduction of the surplus with the Lhlited States as the only
real necessity.
Clearly there are lirnits to the ability of Japan's politicians tofulfili ttre ocpectations of international cpinion r:nIess they can
rely on a sor*h, broadly-based national consensus reaching beyond
govlrnrrent and a&ninistration to take j:r the pa.rties, the rnajn
industrial and financial groups and public opirrion as a vrhole.
At present this seems a long way off '
TT{E EC \rIEW
l4aintainjng a liberal system of wcrld trade requi-res an inpro-
velent jn the Ccnnn:nity's relatiorrs with Japan wherever lnssi-bIe.
It is hard"Iy acceptable tlnt Ja1xn, as the wrcrld's ttrird largest
econdfl)r, and the Ccnnninity, witJr a 1rcp:Iation of 320 milIion, re-
presenling over a fifth of total world production, should continue
to Ue separated by trade, industrial and fjnanciaL conflicts arrd
not cooperate npre closely on nost international ecrcncnric problerns.
Corpreherrsive, diversified cooperation betlreen the tr.rc sides is
neeAeO in order to find ways of achieving nore harnonious rtorld
econonic gl:ol^Ith, establishilg a npre stable and pred.ictabl-e .inter-
national rnonetary systsn, ard presendng and strengtlreniag the
nmltilateral trading systen. Itris bilateral relationship vrculd
form part of ttre wider mperation betr,'een the three nlai:r "r,restern"
econctnic pohiersT the United States, the ff and Jatrnn; in other
r,"Ords, relatiOns bet\^reen the tvp last-rraned pcr'Ers nust becCne
aS strong and ststained as ttrose *lich each of thon enjcys with
ttre United States.
Tb this end Japan and the Cauru.rnity need to coordinate tJ-ei-r eco-
rsnic policies nrrre effecti'rely. they shotild collaborate jI deve-
loping the international rple of the yen al.)q the luu as paylrEnt
and resenre curr:encies. If the multilateral trading systern is
t" ua preserred and strengttrened, Japan must take effective
steps -to Urlog its bilateial s.rrpluses-under control, and th,at
,,=*r= paying lrpre attention to the yen's rate lgains9 ry"oPe?"
crrn:encies. Clear}y, too, closer econonric links rryould be heI@
by greater 19o;t Sgetration in the form of j::vestrnent projects
oi &cnalge of technology, girren a prcrpiticrrs environnent.
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Cooperation is also needed jx tte search for solutions to inter-
national problems of mutual concern, such as developnent aid, on
vftrich Japan and the Cormunity often, in fact, have rattrer sirnilar
vj-ews. It is tlre Cqnnission's belief that such cooperation with
Japan is in the interests of the Ccnnn:nity.
the rj-sk of trade conflicts, ru;ltilateral rather than bilateral,
perhaps, nay rernain aqrte for scne tjJre, ho,trever, and could jndeedjncrease over the ne>ct tuo years. Despite its huge surpluses,
high grourttr rates, Io,,r unenploynent and inflation and pomerful
rnarl:facturing and technological base, Japan is still not playing
an international role cunnensurate wittr its econcrnic weight. The
sense of responsSJcility and strong leadership evirrced by the govern-
rent in ltokyo have not done away with the nnrltilateral stnrctural
inbalance vd:ich tlrreatens the foundations of post-raar cooperation
and represents a 'ireritable tine-bcnb withirr the tradilg qgstem.
A1co[rolic beverages - a test case
!f,riIe Japan frequently claims that its rnarket is arong the npst
cperr irt the v'rorId, in scne sectors this is still far frcrn the
case. Ihe Ccrmnission recently released a shrdlr (*) vd:ich dennn-
strates conclusively that the Japanese alcotrolic beverages ildustryis heavily protected by a varietlr of fiscal and other nechani-srs.
For wine, ttre protection is actrierred rnainly by inposing nmch (up
to I tjJres) heavier dtrties on bottled wjne than crr bulk wine, ttrusglving Japanese bottlers access to cheap raw materials. Highquality wines are fi.rrther penalized by an ad rzalorern ta<.
For vfiislqr, brandy and cogrnac, the protectj-on rezults frcnr ttre
veqr healry tax rates furposed on tlre iJrported prodtrcts. h the
case of vf,ris}ry, for exanple, the systenr is as fo1lcr^rs : Jalxn de-
fjnes 3 grades of "virislqy", special, first and second. ltre tax on
"sg:eciaI" is twie that on "first" and seven tilres ttrat on
"secsrd". Al"1 s@tch and rrish utriskies are autcrnatically clas-
sified as "s[:eci.aI g::ade" ard so pay tl:e heaviest tax rate. Indeed
the lst and 2nd grade "ltriskies- rnade il Japan r,rculd not be reco-gnized as wttislqz elserrifiere in ttre developed rrorld. Ttre ta< and
classj-fication system for brandy and cognac is simirar. rn each
case, the protection is reinforced by hearrlz sustcrns duties vrhich,
(*)-suray 
on ff wines a'd liquor exports to Japan", a,rai-1ab1e i.nErglish and Japarrese frcm the tr Delegation :n fUcyo.
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even after the Action kograrnre cuts, rernain rnich higher than the
E duty rates.
The Ccnrnunity has called on Jatrxn il> reform this system. A first
round of talks was held in April in wtrich detailed prolnsals were
put for,rard. The Ccnnnrnity hopes that the Japanese auttrorlties
will take rapid actj-on wl'rich will have an irmrediate and positive
inpact on the floru of i-nports of wjres and liquor into Japan. Remo-
vi.i:g the tax and duty barriers will enable Erropean products, vtrich
are of high Erality, to ccnpete under fair and open conditions.
Ttris reform could be achieved witlrout any loss of revenue for the
gioverrurent of Japan, sinply by redistriJruting the fiscal burdenfairly.
The Council of lfinister's Declaration
In Februarly this year, the Presidsrt of t-lre EC Ccnrnission, I'lr.
,facques Delors, stressed during an official visit Lo Japan ttnt(a) Japanrs inports of nnnufactured goods and processed food are
corpa.ritively inadeq:ale to nailtain ttre ra,orld multilateral tra-
ding system, that (b) Japan should o<pand dcnestic demand and ttrat(c) Japan should contjnue to liberalize its fjrnncial and capital
nrarkets. He enphasized the need for closer cooperation with Japan
and agreed with Prine Milister }trakasone on setting up a special
nonitoring systern to be Ied by one official on each side respon-
sible directly to IrE. Delors and to InIr. Nakasone.
Fo}lowing l,lr. Delors' visit, the tr Ccnmission sent a report(CoIt{(86)60) to the Co:ncil analyzing the EErs relations wittt
Japan and rnking reccnunendations. After discussions in Februarlz
and l4arcfr, tlre Council endorsed tlre Conmissi-on's vieras. ft issued
a statenrent utrich, inter aIia, wErrned tJ:at no ne\Ar crcncessions will
be rnade to Japarr jrr tlre forthccniing Nerv Ror:rul of nultilateral nego-
tiations under tJ:e GATI without a fundanental change in Japan's
reluctancre to irrport rnanufactured goods and processed agricrrltural
products.
Ttre Cor:ncil considers it highly inportant that Japan shor:1d :
- 
jldicate wiren a sigo:ificant jlcrease of nanufacilrred goods and
processed agricultural products inports into Japan can be expected;
such an indication r^rcu1d increase Japan's credij:ility vis-E-vis its
tradi-rrg partners;
- take furbher early steps, to stjmulate dcnrestic dernand effec-
tivel-y;
- avoid llpasures vd:ich could r,veaken the effect on ttre trade irrbalance
of the recent efforts to strengthen the yen and stjmulate internal
derend;
- speed up the Ii-beralization of Japanese financial nnrkets; and
"'/e
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- introduce the stl~ctural reforms enabling the Japanese economy 
to become more integrated with the econanies of its partners. 
'Ihe EC Council strongly supported the Ccmnission 1 s intentions to 
- arrange with the Japanese government regular and detailed joint 
monitoring of the Japanese Action Programme and other market 
opening measures; 
- keep up pressure on Japan for a greater and more effective libe-
ralization, against finn deadlines, of Japanese mrkets (visible 
obstacles, non-tariff measures, standards and certification pro-
cedures and tenns for investment in Japan) particularly in cer-
tain specific sectors such as the alcoholic beverages sector; 
- keep constantly under review the redress available to the Community 
in GA'IT to canbat unfair trade, including anti -dUITq?ing actions, 
and to study thoroughly the practical use of GA'IT Article XXIII. 2; 
- press the Japanese government to mitigate the effects of the trade 
imbalance by increasing multilateral untied aid. 
'Ihe Council underlines the necessity to re-establish a true balance 
of advantage between Japan and the Camruni ty. In particular, it 
noted that, in the context of the GA'IT, and in the context of the 
New Round of multilateral negotiations and its preparation, the 
present imbalance of real advantages between Japan and its part-
ners will have to be dealt with. For Japan to be able to benefit 
fran further concessions fran the Camruni ty 'Which would be subs-
tantially to its advantage will require a :fundanental change in 
Japan 1 s reluctance to iJri:x:>rt manufactured and processed agricultural 
products. 
'Ihe Council took note of the Ccmnission 1 s proposals for strengthening 
the dialogue in a number of areas such as science and technology, 
industrial cooperation, econanic and financial policy, monetary 
questions and North-South issues, including the debt problem. 
Throughout its analysis the Commission seeks a more constructive 
and cooperative relationship with Japan, calling upon the Ccmnu-
nity itself to multiply its efforts; in particular it proposes 
measures during the next two years to double activities aimed at 
language training and backup for small and medium-size f inns on 
the Japanese market. 
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